Tool reference

All 22 tools at MCP v1 GA. Each handler lives in apps/mcp/src/tools/<tool>.ts. Format per tool: name · scope · category · annotations. Full input/output schemas in the source file.

Write tools (`/write` endpoint, 60 req/min cap)

Tool	Scope	Annotations
`payments.initiate`	`payments:initiate`	destructive · idempotent · requires human approval (step-up threshold)
`payments.simulate`	`payments:simulate`	read-only · idempotent (dry-run)
`cards.issue`	`cards:manage`	idempotent
`cards.freeze`	`cards:manage`	idempotent (already_frozen is no-op)
`beneficiary.add`	`beneficiary:write`	requires human approval (principal multisig-proposal gate)
`transfer.schedule`	`payments:initiate`	idempotent · policy re-eval at execute time
`payroll.run`	`payments:initiate`	destructive · requires human approval · V2-dep-flagged
`x402.pay`	`x402:pay`	destructive · idempotent · F1 server-fetch tx verify
`x402.receive`	`x402:receive`	read-only (endpoint metadata describe)

Read tools (`/read` endpoint, 300 req/min cap)

Tool	Scope
`accounts.list`	`accounts:read`
`accounts.balance`	`accounts:read`
`transactions.list`	`accounts:read`
`agents.list`	`agents:read`
`skills.list`	`agents:read`
`audit.stream`	`audit:stream` (mints SSE cursor — `idempotentHint=false`)

Treasury tools (`/treasury` endpoint, 10 req/min cap)

Tool	Scope	Notes
`agent.budget.create`	`agent:budget:create`	saga with 4-step rollback; requires human approval
`agent.budget.revoke`	`agent:budget:revoke`	destructive · auto-sweep on by default
`agent.grant.issue`	`agent:budget:create`	step-up required; refuses scope escalation
`vault.rotateSigner`	`treasury:rotate-signer`	step-up required; bumps policy_version
`yield.allocate`	`treasury:yield-allocate`	V3-dep-flagged; envelope step-up respected
`killSwitch.all`	`agent:budget:revoke`	destructive · emergency · `confirm_scope` literal required

Step-up flow (shared)

Write/treasury tools over the envelope return JSON-RPC -32003 with:

{
  "code": -32003,
  "message": "amount 60000 requires step-up approval",
  "data": {
    "reason_id": "step_up_required",
    "step_up_url": "https://app.glide.co/step-up/<sigil>"
  }
}

Surface the URL to the user. They biometric-approve on the Glide sheet. Retry the tool with step_up_sigil=<sigil>. CAS-claim guarantees first-use-only; a 5-minute grace window returns the same payload to benign polls (prevents re-asking on network retry).

Annotations honored by MCP clients

Per MCP 2025-11-25 spec:

readOnlyHint: no side effects.
destructiveHint: cannot be undone by the tool itself.
idempotentHint: safe to retry with same params.
openWorldHint: interacts with external systems (x402.pay, facilitators).

Glide extension:

requiresHumanApproval: client SHOULD surface the step-up flow to the user even before calling.

Official Glide clients (Claude Desktop, ChatGPT Apps, Vertex) verify emitted annotations match the client-side registry; mismatch = refuse to execute. Custom runtimes that bypass this client-side check are still caught by the server-side annotation check on each call.

OAuth flow Partner registry submissions

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Tool reference

Write tools (`/write` endpoint, 60 req/min cap)

Read tools (`/read` endpoint, 300 req/min cap)

Treasury tools (`/treasury` endpoint, 10 req/min cap)

Step-up flow (shared)

Annotations honored by MCP clients

​Write tools (/write endpoint, 60 req/min cap)

​Read tools (/read endpoint, 300 req/min cap)

​Treasury tools (/treasury endpoint, 10 req/min cap)

​Step-up flow (shared)

​Annotations honored by MCP clients

Write tools (`/write` endpoint, 60 req/min cap)

Read tools (`/read` endpoint, 300 req/min cap)

Treasury tools (`/treasury` endpoint, 10 req/min cap)

Step-up flow (shared)

Annotations honored by MCP clients